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• 
Roger J. Miner 
u.s. Circuit Judge 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
Georgetown University Law Center 
The Federalist Society 
February 20, 1986 
In observing the work of lawyers in the courts in which I 
have served and in other courts, I have generally been impressed 
with the service that the bar has rendered in.the representation 
of clients. I have not been quite so impressed, however, with 
the performance of the bar in the discharge of its duty to 
society as a whole. It is the willingness to accept this public 
responsibility function that distinguishes the bar as a 
profession. The value of the calling is diminished to the extent 
that any one lawyer shirks his or her professional obligation of 
service to the community. 
There are many duties implicated in the concept of public 
responsibility -- the duty to undertake the representation of 
indigent clients without charge {if more lawyers performed this 
duty, perhaps the public expense for such representation could be 
greatly reduced or eliminated); the duty to see that able and 
honest men and women are appointed and elected as judges; the 
duty to aid in the improvement of legal education; the duty to 
maintain the competence and integrity of the bar, and to disclose 
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violations of the rules of professional conduct; the duty to set 
an example and maintain public confidence by avoiding even minor 
violations of law; the duty to seek legislative and 
administrative changes to improve the law and the legal system; 
and the duty to educate the public and to protect it from the 
unauthorized practice of law. 
Another duty, and the one upon which I intend to focus my 
remarks tonight, is the duty to criticize the courts. It is my 
premise that informed criticism of the courts and their decisions 
is not merely a right but an ethical obligation imposed upon 
every member of the bar. I also hold that judges should not 
respond to such criticism, and in fact should never express any 
extra-judicial opinion regarding legal or constitutional issues 
that may come before the courts. 
There is a Canon in the Code of Professional Responsibility 
that instructs lawyers to assist in improving the legal system. 
The Ethical Considerations relating to that Canon observe that 
lawyers are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the 
system and to initiate corrective measures. They encourage the 
legal profession to support changes in the law when existing 
rules eventuate in unjust results. The Preamble to the new Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the American Bar 
Association urges that lawyers should employ their knowledge to 
reform the law. In my opinion these admonitions speak to a duty 
on the part of lawyers to identify and discuss incorrect actions 
by the courts, subject only to the requirement that the criticism 
be impelled by a good-faith desire for improvement in the law and 
the legal system. 
I do not speak here of malicious or false statements about a 
judge or of disruptive or contemptuous conduct in the courtroom. 
These never can be countenanced, and I have kept with me for 
nearly thirty years a case I read in law school regarding a 
penalty imposed for behavior of this type. The decision is taken 
from the ancient English Reports and is one of those collected by 
Sir James Dyar, sometime Chief Justice of Common Pleas. It is 
reported as follows: "RICHARDSON, Chief Justice of C.B. at the 
assizes at Salisbury in the summer of 1631 was assaulted by a 
prisoner condemned there for felony, who after his condemnation 
threw a brick bat at the said Judge, which narrowly missed; and 
for this an indictment was immediately drawn • • • against the 
prisoner, and his right hand cut off and fixed to the gibbet, 
upon which he was himself immediately hanged in the presence of 
the Court." It seems to me that the judge overreacted somewhat 
in spite of the provocation. Of course, there are those who 
today would consider tossing a brick to be "protected expression.• 
I do realize that it sometimes is necessary for a lawyer to bite 
his or her tongue when in the presence of some particularly 
arbitrary tyrant in a black robe. My father, who has been 
practicing law for sixty years, holds in the highest regard the 
lawyer who made some intemperate remark during a long and heated 
argument with a judge. When the judge shouted: "Counsellor,you 
have been showing your contempt of this court," the lawyer 
responded: "No, your honor, I have been trying to conceal it." 
While lawyers generally feel free to criticize the state of 
the law in relation to rules of court, statutes and even the 
Constitution itself, there is a noticeable reluctance to 
criticize judge-made law, specific judicial decisions or 
individ~al judges. Yet, the public responsibility function of 
the bar is just as implicated in the latter as in the former. 
Why the distinction? I think that the answer lies in the 
( unfortunate, but well-grounded, fear that affronts to tender 
judicial sensibilities may result in unnecessary antagonisms, 
disciplinary action or worse. For example, in 1830, Judge James 
H. Peck of the United States District Court for the District of 
Missouri disbarred and imprisoned a lawyer for publishing a 
letter critical of one of his decisions. Although this 
disgraceful episode led to an impeachment proceeding and caused 
Congress to curtail the summary contempt power of the federal 
courts, echoes of the Peck case were heard in a decision handed 
down by the Supreme Court at its last term. The decision 
reversed a six-month suspension from federal practice imposed 
upon Robert J. Snyder by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for 
conduct said to be prejudicial to the administration of justice 
and unbecoming a member of the bar. Snyder's difficulties 
stemmed from a letter he wrote to the United States District 
Court for the District of North Dakota. The letter was written 
after the circuit court had twice returned his Criminal Justice 
Act fee application for insufficient documentation. In his 
correspondence, Snyder refused to provide further information, 
generally criticized the inadequacy of the fees authorized in 
similar cases, expressed his disgust at the treatment afforded to 
him by the circuit and directed that his name be removed from the 
list of attorneys available for criminal defense assignments. 
The district court judge, finding nothing offensive in the 
letter, and perceiving some merit in Snyder's criticisms, passed 
the letter on to the circuit. A three-judge panel of the circuit 
ultimately found that the statement, which Snyder refused to 
retract, was disrespectful, contentious and beyond the bounds of 
proper comment and criticism. 
In reversing the panel decision, Chief Justice Burger wrote: 
"We do not consider a lawyer's criticism of the administration 
of the [Criminal Justice] Act or criticism of inequities in 
assignments under the Act as cause for discipline or suspension. 
• • • Officers of the court may appropriately express criticism 
on such matters." The Chief Justice observed that the circuit 
court had acknowledged the meritorious nature of Snyder's 
criticism and, as a result, had instituted a study of the 
administration of the Criminal Justice Act. In light of that 
observation, I believe that the Chief Justice missed an excellent 
opportunity to comment on the attorney's duty to criticize the 
courts and the beneficial purposes served by the performance of 
that duty. Snyder's actions were well within the bounds of the 
public responsibility he assumed when he became a member of the 
bar. This is so because a lawyer is obliged not only to educate 
the public about the law, the legal system and the judges but to 
inform the courts as well. 
Justice Jackson once wrote that "criticism by the profession 
is one of the most important criteria in appraising a decision's 
real weight in subsequent cases. • Justice Brewer said: "It is a 
mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored or 
helped by being spoken of as beyond criticism. On the contrary, 
the life and character of its justices should be the objects of 
constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments subject to the 
freest criticism." "I have no patience," said Chief Justice 
Harlan F. Stone, "with the complaint that criticism of judicial 
action involves any lack of respect for the courts. When the 
courts deal, as ours do, with great public questions, the only 
protection against unwise decisions and even judicial usurpation, 
is careful scrutiny of their action and fearless comment upon 
it." 
And so it is that when the Attorney General of the United 
States publicly criticizes certain decisions of the Supreme 
Court, as he has done in recent months, he is acting in the 
highest traditions of the legal profession. By leading serious 
discussions of constitutional doctrine important to the citizenry 
and to the courts, he performs the public service encouraged by 
Justices Jackson, Brewer and Stone. It ill behooves members of 
the bar to ridicule and abuse a fellow member of the profession 
for fostering the robust and uninhibited debate that is the 
hallmark of a free society. When Stephen A. Douglas denounced 
Abraham Lincoln for questioning the validity of the infamous Dred 
Scott decision, Lincoln replied as follows: •we believe as much 
as [Mr.] Douglas (perhaps more) in obedience to and respect for 
the judicial department of government. We think its decisions on 
constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control not 
only the particular case decided, but the general policy of the 
country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the 
Constitution, as provided in that instrument itself. More than 
this would be revolution. But we think the Dred Scott decision 
is erroneous. We know the court that made it has often 
overrruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have 
it overrule this." Lincoln was a great lawyer who well 
understood the public responsibility of the bar. 
It has never been the place of a judge, however, to respond 
to specific criticism, and I think that it is unseemly for 
Justices of the Supreme Court to engage in public argument with 
the Attorney General or any other lawyer for the purpose of 
defending the position of the Court on one issue or another. 
Such discourse not only detracts from the dignity of the court 
but also communicates an unwillingness to maintain the openness 
of mind so essential for the proper performance of the judicial 
role. When the judiciary undertakes a point-by-point defense of 
criticism leveled by members of the bar, it discourages what it 
should encourage and protect. Even in the case of unfair and 
unjust criticism, the bench must remain silent, leaving to the 
bar its ethical obligation to come to the defense of the 
judiciary in such situations. 
The judiciary should assure the bar that critical comments 
of all kinds are welcomed. It should heed the message of Justice 
Frankfurter that "judges must be kept mindful of their 
limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a 
vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt." 
The Justices of the Supreme Court and of every other court in the 
land must recognize, as did Frankfurter, that lawyers "are under 
a special responsibility to exercise fearlessness" in criticizing 
the courts. When Justice Brennan wrote in the Sawyer case that 
"lawyers are free to criticise the state of the law," he reserved 
no rebuttal time for the judiciary. 
I believe that judges generally are too free in giving their 
out-of-court opinions on matters that may eventually be put 
before them for decision. Several years ago, a colleague of mine 
who has served for many years on the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals wrote a piece for the New York Times entitled "Judges 
Must Speak Out." Ever since I read that essay, I have been 
contemplating a companion piece entitled: "Judges Must Shut Up." 
It has long been accepted that no judge should become 
committed on any issue of fact or law until that issue is 
properly presented to the judge in the course of an actual case 
or controversy. The rule is a simple but salutary one. It 
communicates to those on either side of an issue that a logical 
and well-constructed argument might carry the day in persuading 
an impartial court to a desired conclusion. It communicates that 
the judge has no fixed agenda and is receptive to new ideas and 
approaches (and even to old ideas and approaches) on a 
case-by-case basis. It lends confidence to those with actual 
disputes to be resolved, and it reinforces the beneficial rule 
set down by Francis Bacon in his essay "Of Judicature": "Judges 
ought to remember that their office is jus dicere and not jus 
dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law." 
In the same essay, Bacon said: "An overspeaking judge is no 
well-tuned cymbal." Unfortunately, many of these poorly tuned 
instruments continue to play, rendering decisions and giving 
opinions when they are not officially asked to do so and 
consequently disturbing the confidence necessary for the 
effective operation of the judiciary. Let me hasten to add that 
there are numerous matters upon which judges can and should be 
heard -- matters affecting administration of the legal system, 
procedural rules and ethical standards. A judge also should 
teach and write about the law in an expository way, pointing to 
trends and changes in decisions already written and in 
legislation already adopted. A judge should encourage debate 
about controversial constitutional and legal issues without 
participating in the debate. I have lectured and written about 
the public accountability of judges -- the need for judges to 
report to the citizenry about developments in the law and the 
legal system. In all these activities, however, opinions must be 
avoided. Such opinions manifest the disease of judicial activism 
in one of its most virulent forms. Lawyers, law professors and 
law students must be the advocates, debaters and opinion molders. 
As for judges -- even those former academics who find it so 
difficult to doff the academic gown -- by their official 
decisions alone must they be known. 
I have enjoyed being with you tonight and meeting so many 
bright young law students. In light of the upcoming bicentennial 
of the Constitution, the objectives of your organization take on 
a special significance. I believe that your interest in an 
historical examination of the sources, meaning and intentions 
behind our great Charter is very much in order, although others 
say that such an undertaking has little relevance to modern law 
and society. To my mind, a concern for the principles of 
federalism and the separation of powers is not linked to any one 
political party or philosophy. As you all know, the federal 
judiciary was conceived of as the least dangerous branch, the 
weakest of the three departments of power, limited to an 
interpretive function, with no influence over the sword or purse. 
When the judiciary oversteps its constitutional bounds, it merits 
censure from the bar, and court decisions that are not guided by 
constitutional principles likewise deserve condemnation. 
Remember always that where there is temperate criticism of the 
courts for constructive and positive purposes, grounded in good 
faith and reason, the judiciary is strengthened, the rule of law 
is reinforced and the public duty of the bar is performed. 
Since this is an institution of higher learning, I close 
with a final examination. I'll give you a quotation and you tell 
me the name of the author. Here's the quotation: "The Court •• 
• has improperly set itself up as • • • a superlegislature • • • 
1 1 
reading into the Constitution words and implications which are 
not there, and which were never intended to be there. • • • We 
want a Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution 
-- not over it.• The name of the author is -- Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. 
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Cranch) 267 (1806), a court does not 
have diversity jurisdiction over a 
suit by a plaintiff against a partner-
ship in which any partner's citizen-
ship is identical to that of the 
plaintiff."~ 
Judge Lasker, therefore, dismissed 
the complaint finding that a number 
. o~ partners of defendant Solomon 
Brothers were. like plaintiff, citizens 
of New Jersey. He rejected an argu-
ment that the non-diverse partners 
be dropped under Rule 19(b) as "non-
indispensable." 111 He also rejected an 
argument that partnerships in disso-
lack of diversity between the plaintiff 
and some of the defendant partners.12 
Permissive Counterclaims 
Nadja de Magalhaes Spencer v. 
Banco Real, S.A., et al.,n decided by 
Judge Kram on Dec. 10, underscored 
the ·need for an independent jurisdic-
tional basis for permissive counter-
claims. In this case, originally 
brought as a Title VII action, Judge 
Kram dismissed a counterclaim 
which she found to be permissive 
rather than compulsory for lack of 
independent jurisdictional grounds. 
against an opposing party. Such un-
related counterclaims are referred to 
as permissive, since a party need not 
plead them, but instead may bring a · 
Separate action on the claim in the 
forum of his own choosing. H arri8, 
571 F. 2d at 121-22. However, If a per· 
missive couriterclaim is raised in a 
federal district court, an independent 
jurisdictional ground must exist."~ 
Failure to follow the local Southern 
and Eastern District rule governing 
interpleader motions resulted in the 
denial of leave to file a third-party 
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